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Abstract
This research studies the presence of ex-post moral hazard in the prevent planting
provision from the crop insurance program in cotton, corn, and soybeans for the Plains Region
and Southeast Regions of the U.S. Three fixed effect models are developed using the proportion
of prevent plant acres as the dependent variable, as well as weather, input price, expected harvest
price and a break-even point for the independent variables. In addition, a fourth fixed effect (FE)
model is introduced using the logit transformation and the same variables as in previous models.
The results show the number of PP claims has been driven not solely by weather conditions but
by other market-related variables such as expected harvest price and input price, for cotton and
soybeans. It is concluded that the proportion of prevented plant acres is endogenous to changes
in the input price, expected harvest price, and break-even point, in the case of cotton and
soybeans, confirming the presence of moral hazard in these two crops. In contrast, the results
show no conclusive evidence that suggests moral hazard in corn.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
After the Great Depression and the Dust Bowl in the 1930s, the U.S. Congress authorized
the creation of the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC), in order to carry out programs
that would help with the recovery of agriculture. The Act of 1980, helped expand crop insurance
to many other crops and regions of the U.S. and the 1994 Act made participation in the program
mandatory for farmers to be eligible for some other farm program benefits. Ever since its
creation the program has grown and continues to grow prominently (RMA).
Consequently, crop insurance has become a part of the suite of agricultural risk
management tools that farmers use for hedging against possible undesirable outcomes, such as
losses in production or a drop-in crop prices, among other events. Under this category of tools,
we can also find futures contracts, forward contracts and spread sales (Velandia et al., 2015).
Moreover, with the objective of reducing ad hoc disaster assistance payments, previously
delivered through ad hoc disaster bills, in the early 1994 the FCIC introduced the Prevent
Planting (PP) provision into the crop insurance program. This became a common component of
crop insurance through the Federal Crop Insurance Reform and Department of Agriculture
Reorganization Act of 1994 (U.S. Congress, 1994).
Currently, this provision can be found under the Revenue Protection (RP), Revenue
Protection with the Harvest Price Exclusion (RP-HPE) and Yield Protection (YP), insurance
plans. Out of which the most popular plan is the Revenue Protection (RP) (Schnitkey et al.,
2020).
Today, subsidized crop insurance has become the main instrument to support U.S.
farmers, accounting for the biggest share of spending under the 2018 Farm Bill, without
considering nutritional assistance, as presented in Figure 1. In 2020 alone, the program managed
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more than $114 billion of insurance liability and had an operating budget of $67.1 million in
2021 (RMA, 2021). The projected outlays for the program are expected to be $41 billion during
2019–2023, according to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO, 2019). Based on the projected
outlays, crop insurance expenditure is expected to continue growing as presented Figure 2. As
the program has grown in importance and as annual outlays have increased, as with any
insurance program, interest in the actuarial soundness of the program and the existence of moral
hazard and adverse selection incentives has also risen.

Budget for the 2018 Farm Bill and the Baseline
in 2022 for Farm Bill Programs (dollars in
millions, 10-year mandatory outlays)
1,200,000
1,000,000
800,000
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Figure 1. 2018 farm bill and projected outlay for the four greatest expenses.
Note: Nutrition (primarily SNAP), Commodities, Crop Insurance, and Conservation, account for 99% of
the 2018 farm bill’s mandatory spending.
Sources: CRS using CRS Report R45425, Budget Issues That Shaped the 2018 Farm Bill; CBO Baseline
(May 2022), at https://www. cbo.gov/about/products/baseline-projections-selected programs, for the five
largest titles; and amounts in law for programs in other titles.
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Percentage change in the projected expenditures
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Figure 2. Change in the projected expenditures for the 5-year and 10-year budget projections.
Notes: Crop insurance has the second greatest increase in expenditures after nutrition.

While many studies have deeply considered the existence and potential corrections for
moral hazard in the crop insurance program, few have focused on moral hazard in prevented
planting (PP). Prevented planting is a provision included in the crop insurance defined as “failure
to plant an insured crop by the final planting date, or within any applicable late planting (LP)
period”, resulting from severe weather events, like drought or excess of moisture (2020
Prevented Planting Standards Handbook).
Since the introduction of the PP provision, there has been a steady increase in prevent
planting claims. Kim and Kim (2018) performed calculations from RMA cause of loss data
showing that prevented planting payments accounted on average for 9% of the total indemnity
from 1998 to 2008. However, from 2009 to 2013 prevented planting payments represented a total
of 17% of the total indemnities. Such an increase in prevented planting payments may be the
result of increased prevalence of extreme weather events in the observed timeframe. However, as
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participation in the crop insurance program has increased, concerns over proper use of the
program increase as well. Moreover, a presence of moral hazard in PP claims behavior would
mean the insurance premium subsidies paid to farmers are having an undesirable effect on
production since it would be incentivizing farmers to not plant on fields that would have
otherwise been planted in the year of the claim. An outcome that is against the goal of the
USDA’s Strategic Plan FY 2014–2018, Goal 3, which promotes agricultural production and the
improvement of food security. In short, an effect of moral hazard caused by prevented planting is
the increase of federal crop insurance expenditures by overcompensating producers and
incentivizing the abandonment of profitable production (Boyer and Smith, 2019).
1.1. Moral hazard, asymmetric information and principal- agent problems
Moral hazard in crop insurance is a subset of a class of issues known as principal agent
problems. A principal-agent problem occurs when one of the parties (the agent), works in favor
of another party (the principal) in return of incentives. The work may inflict costs for the agent,
which can cause the agent to ignore the best interest of the principal, thereby creating a conflict
of interest. Asymmetric information which can also be referred to as information failure,
typically refers to the case where one participant in a transaction possesses private information
not known to the other participant(s). Of course, the difference in information can create a
scenario where one of the participants has an advantage over the other. Consequently,
asymmetric information is a primary component of principal-agent problems of which adverse
selection (cases of hidden individual traits generally referred to as types) and moral hazard (cases
of hidden or unknown actions) are problems commonly found within insurance.
In insurance, hidden actions of moral hazard refer to the way the agent’s actions affect
the distribution of covered events. Hence, the individual who performs the action (the agent),
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takes on more risk because another (the principal) bears the cost of that risk, and the agent’s
actions are hidden from the principal. The agent in this case is the insured individual and the
principal is the insurer. Moral hazard has the effect of increasing the cost of offering insurance
since it has the effect of increasing the cost and/or the severity of claims. Effectively, asymmetric
information problems such as moral hazard is a form of market failure in insurance markets
(Roberts, Key and O’Donoghue 2006).
Crafting effective solutions to moral hazard problems in insurance, and crop insurance
specifically, requires an understanding of the complex patterns that may give rise to this
behavior. The literature subdivides moral hazard issues into two types depending on the timing
of actions relative to the event leading to a claim. Ex-ante refers to a change in behavior of the
insured before losses occur, e.g. if a farmer changes his/her input use, because they have crop
insurance, compared to a farmer without it (Rees and Wambach, 2008). This behavior can
increase the frequency and potentially the severity of claims. Ex- post refers to a change in
behavior of the insured after losses have occurred, e.g. a farmer may decide to reduce pesticide
application in a year with high pest pressure. Ex-post moral hazard tends to increase the cost of
an insured event that has occurred (Zweifel and Eisen 268-291). Specific to this study, the
prevented planting provision of crop insurance is susceptible to both types of moral hazard. For
example, ex-ante moral hazard would occur if the cost factors, used to determine the amount of a
prevented planting payment, are set too high. In this case a farmer may conceivably incorporate
fields that are more susceptible to insured planting challenges, e.g. frequent floods, etc. On the
other hand, ex-post moral hazard would occur if late planting was possible, but a farmer
abandons a field and accepts a prevent plant payment when harvest prices seem unfavorable.
Each of these scenarios has the effect of increasing the cost of providing crop insurance,
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additionally, affects total production in years where prevented planting claims are made. As
prevented planting claims increase over time, the need to understand and mitigate potential moral
hazard incentives also increases in importance. While several steps have been taken to reduce exante moral hazard in prevented planting over the years, such as adjustments in the PP cost factors
(USDA-RMA, 2018) and the introduction of the 1 in 4 rule (RMA, 2021), less has been done
from a policy perspective to address the potential for ex-post moral hazard in the provision. This
study therefore serves to identify and better understand the mechanisms that lead to ex-post
moral hazard in the provision of Prevent Planting.
1.2. Choosing prevented planting or late planting and moral hazard incentives
Prevented planting coverage is available for YP, RP or RP-HPE crop insurance plans
purchased at the buy-up level. A farmer who is prevented from planting the lesser of 20 acres or
20% of his insured acres (Frankenfield, 2018) before the final planting date can accept a
prevented planting (PP) payment or instead, late plant (LP), with a coverage level, reduced by
the number of days after the final planting date. Prevented planting payments comprise of
several components which include the prevented planting coverage factor (given as a percentage
of the crop insurance guarantee and is based on an estimate of the pre-planting costs for a
specific crop), the insurance coverage level or coverage rate (from 50% up to 85%), the
projected price or guarantee price, the per-acre production guarantee or production history (APH
which is an estimate of the average per acre crop yield for the previous 4-10 years), and the
number of acres prevented from planting.
As an example, if a soybean producer is protected against lost production with revenue
protection (RP) with a 60% PP coverage factor (which is 55% for corn and 60% for soybean), an
80% insurance coverage under the RP insurance plan, have a projected price of $10/bushel, APH
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of 90 bushel/ acre, and is prevented from planting more than 20 acres, the indemnity payment
s/he would receive would be equal to 0.60*0.8*10*90= $432/acre. The decision to accept a
prevented planting payment has to be balanced with the decision to late plant, the same which
will carry a reduced crop insurance guarantee and an increased risk of reduced harvest yields.
1.3. Economic framework
The economic framework is borrowed from Kim and Kim (2018) in order to establish the
decision process of whether to accept prevented planting vs choosing to late plant (LP). A risk
averse and profit maximizing farmer will have a profit function as in equation (1) if s/he chooses
to make a prevented planting claim.
𝜋𝑝𝑝 = 𝛳𝑝𝑝 ∗ 𝛳 ∗ 𝑝𝑔 ∗ 𝑞 𝐴𝑃𝐻 − 𝑐1 − 𝑝𝑚 − 𝑐𝑐𝑣

(1)

Where 𝜋𝑝𝑝 is the profit received for the PP claim, 𝛳𝑝𝑝 is the PP coverage factor (55% for
corn and 60% for soybean), 𝛳 is the insurance coverage, 𝑝𝑔 is the projected price or guarantee
price in $/bushel, 𝑞 𝐴𝑃𝐻 is the production history (APH) in bushel/acre, 𝑐1 is the input cost for
planting the first crop, 𝑝𝑚 is the crop insurance premium paid in $/acre, 𝑐𝑐𝑣 is the cost for
planting a cover crop in $/acre; which is a condition to claim the PP.
On the other hand, if the farmer opts to Late Plant a second crop, the coverage level will
be reduced by 1% per day, starting from the last day of the planting period. Consequently, the
farmer’s profit when late planting is reflected in the equation (2) as follows:
𝜋̃𝐿𝑝 = [(𝑝̃ ∗ 𝑞̃ − 𝑐1 − 𝑝𝑚 − 𝑐2 + max {0, 𝑖𝑛𝑗 }], j= yp, rp (2)
Where 𝜋̃𝐿𝑝 is the estimated profit received for late planting (LP) a second crop, 𝑝̃ is the
uncertain crop price in $/bushel, 𝑞̃ is the uncertain yield in bushels/acre, 𝑐1 is the cost for
planting the first crop, 𝑝𝑚 is the crop insurance premium paid in $/acre, 𝑐2 is the cost for
planting a second crop, and max {0, 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗 } is the indemnity the farmer expects
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depending on the type of crop insurance j= yield protection (yp), revenue protection (rp). (Kim
and Kim, 2018).
For a farmer deciding whether to accept a PP payment or to LP, s/he will be indifferent
when the profit for the PP claim 𝜋𝑝𝑝 equals the sum of the expected profit for LP 𝜋̃𝐿𝑝 and the
risk premium 𝑅𝑃𝑟 based on the farmer’s risk preferences as in equation (3).
𝜋𝑝𝑝 = 𝜋̃𝐿𝑝 + 𝑅𝑃𝑟

(3)

Given that 𝜋̃𝐿𝑝 decreases as input costs increase or as the projected price decreases, a
farmer’s incentive to accept (PP) increases as expected costs increase or as expected prices
decrease.
1.4. Problem identification
Based on the exploratory research, there is little information up to date with respect to the
presence of moral hazard in the PP program for three crops selected. The growth of the program
and number of PP claims, create the question of whether this growth is related to normal causes
such as a wider adoption of the program and extreme weather patterns, or if it the result of the
presence of moral hazard. The farmer’s decision making-process, as described in the
introduction, is necessary to understand how the provision may have some flaws that might be
incentivizing the increase on PP claims.
1.5. Significance of study
Several studies have investigated the existence of moral hazard related to prevented
planting. Following these studies, changes have been made to the national regulation of the
prevented planting provision to account for moral hazard incentives, such as the change made in
2017 by the RMA in the payment structure, reducing the coverage factor for corn, in order to
balance indemnities with the estimated pre-planting costs and reduce ex-ante moral hazard
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incentives. However, as shown in studies such as Kim and Kim (2018) and Wu et al (2020) for
example, moral hazard incentives, specifically ex-post moral hazard incentives, likely still exist.
Furthermore, while work has been done demonstrating the potential existence of ex-post moral
hazard in prevented planting claims, much is still to be known about the mechanism through
which such ex-post moral hazard incentives arise. Such an understanding allows the RMA more
precision in anticipating indemnity payment patterns as well as insights for updates to the
program to improve its performance. This study accounts for weather variables, but most
importantly for market factors like input cost and crop price expectation. Additionally, dissimilar
to some work done in the past, we use the RMA projected price with a state level basis
correction, as opposed to the previous year’s harvest price, as a more realistic measure of the
farmer’s expected harvest price. We also account for the potentially asymmetric response of PP
acreage to changes in the expected price. Results from this study update our understanding of
moral hazard incentives in PP.
1.6. Objectives
The general objective of the study is to test for the presence of ex-post moral hazard in
cotton, corn, and soybeans for the Plains Region and Southeast Regions. The specific objectives
of the study are:
1. Review the most important variables introduced in previous models to identify
ex-post moral hazard in prevent planting.
2. Develop a base model according to the literature review.
3. Conduct a model specification test.
4. Improve the base model by introducing the break-even cost bound.
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5. Analyze how expected prices below the break-even cost influence the number of
PP claims.
1.7. General procedures
A background of the base model, as well as improvements to the model, and the research
procedures use in this study are presented in Chapter 2. Moreover, the analysis of the results is
presented in Chapter 3. Finally, a summary and conclusions are presented in the last section in
Chapter 4.
1.8. Literature review
There have been studies suggesting the provision under the crop insurance program is
susceptible to moral hazard. In fact, several studies have investigated and demonstrated the
existence of moral hazard related to post planting changes in behavior.
Velandia et al. (2015) analyze farmer’s decision to participate in crop insurance based on
some factors such as owned acres, off-farm income, education, age, and business risk. They
developed a multivariate and multinomial probit model, finding that producers consider the
interaction between the different risk management tools, taking the correlation between the tools
in their final decision process, to select their portfolio of risk management instruments.
On the other hand, Babcock (2015) examines how the coverage choice can be better
explained using prospect theory rather than expected utility maximization. Their results
demonstrate that farmers would choose a lower coverage level than the predicted with expected
utility maximization. They note that premiums could be fair in aggregated levels but not at the
individual level.
Moreover, Connor and Katchova (2020) examine how crop insurance and moral hazard
can affect variability and drought susceptibility on corn and soybean yields likely because of
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lower quality lands being incorporated brought into production once insured. They find that
when crop participation increases by 1 percentage point, drought susceptibility also increases by
1.2%.
In addition, Chen and Miranda (2007) found out that unfavorable weather increases crop
abandonment among corn producers in North Central, Central Plains and Southeast regions and
among upland cotton producers in all Southern regions. Subsequently, they found a decline of
futures prices during the growing season will also increase crop abandonment in most regions
with the exception for corn in Southern, Plains and upland cotton in Southeast.
Rejesus, Escalante, and Lovell (2005) determined that crop insurance incentivize farmers
to choose prevent plating (PP), with indemnity payments that exceeded the cost invested in the
crop. Their results showed that the decision to submit the prevent plant (PP) claim is based on
opportunity cost principles resulting in ex-ante moral hazard incentives. This study and a similar
study by Rejesus et al (2003) led to updates in PP coverage factors to reduce incentives for exante moral hazard. More recent work has looked at the existence of ex-post moral hazard in
prevented planting claims. Ex-post moral hazard in PP is typically associated with increases in
PP claims once an insurable event has occurred. Thus, farmers may have incentive to accept a PP
claim even when late planting is possible. According to the report by USDA-OIG (2013) only
0.1% of producers who receive the prevent planting payment, plant a second crop during the late
planting period.
Kim and Kim (2018) examine how crop insurance affects the farmer’s choice to prevent
plant or late plant, based upon crop prices and the expected yield at harvest time. Using data
from the Corn Belt Region, they assume a risk-averse farmer and determine that the farmer will
choose to late planting if s/he expects higher prices and yield. Concluding, there is ex-post moral
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hazard, and crop insurance increases the likelihood of preventing planting claims over
production during the late planting period.
Likewise, Wu, Goodwin, and Coble (2019) examine how prevent planting claims
increase as the market price for the crop decreases or as the cost of input increases. Indeed, their
results showed that most corn producers would be better off by abandoning profitable production
and taking the prevented planting (PP) indemnity, for most of the days during the late planting
period. These results lead to believe that claims may be endogenous to prices.
Furthermore, Boyer and Smith (2019) study how coverage factors may influence the final
decision to plant during the late planting period. Using data on corn and soybean from two field
experiments in Tennessee, they found out that after a certain date, profit-maximizing producers
would rather abandon production, taking the prevent planting (PP) payment instead of late
planting (LP).
Additionally, Boyer and Smith (2019) found that the increase in coverage level reduces
the number of days during the late plating period when planting would be optimal. Thus, higher
coverage levels increase the incentive to abandon production. In fact, reducing the coverage
factor, extends the number of days during the late planting period where panting is more
profitable. Furthermore, the USDA-RMA has already implemented a change in 2017.
1.9. Conceptual framework
Based on the previous literature, it is concluded that the best approach to identify the
presence of ex-post moral hazard is by starting with a simple economic model, following by the
econometric model and then by the base model constructed accordingly with the literature
review and finally improving the model. A description of the research process is described in
Figure 3 below.

12

Economic
model

Econometric
model from
Kim and
Kim (2018)

Base model
from Wu,
Goodwin,
and Coble
(2019),

Figure 3. Conceptual framework for research development.
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Chapter 2. Methods and Data
2.1. Economic model
To investigate the presence of moral hazard in the prevent planting provision, on cotton,
corn, and soybeans, the study uses literature review to establish that the amount of PP claims is a
function of several factors which are identified next in equation (4):
𝑃𝑃 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑠 = 𝑓(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐, 𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝, 𝑒𝑥𝑝 ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑣 𝑝𝑟, 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑡, 𝑑𝑠𝑢𝑖𝑡)

(4)

Where the PP claims is a function of the precipitation 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐, temperature 𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝, expected
harvest price 𝑒𝑥𝑝 ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑣 𝑝𝑟, input prices 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑡 , days suitable for planting 𝑑𝑠𝑢𝑖𝑡 .
Furthermore, the papers from Wu, Goodwin, and Coble (2019), and Kim and Kim (2018)
served as a starting point for the model specification.
2.2. Econometric model
Following the econometric model from Kim and Kim (2018), the base model is derived
and adapted by introducing several variables, among which one of them is the lower bound price
considered to be the equilibrium price. The model is described in the equation (5) presented
below:
𝑘

𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑘 𝛽𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (5)
𝐾=1

Where, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the proportion of acres prevented from being planted in county 𝑖 and time 𝑡,
the term 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑘 describes all the explanatory variables, such as input price, expected harvest price
and precipitation also for each county 𝑖 and time 𝑡, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 alludes to the error term in county
𝑖 and time 𝑡. Moreover, with this model we can identify the change in each variable and the
effects in the amount of PP claims. The presence of moral hazard would suggest that with higher
crop prices, and lower input prices, the amount of PP claims should be smaller, maintaining all
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the other variables constant. Likewise, excess of precipitation or extreme temperatures would
also increase the likelihood of PP claims, which could be attributable to natural causes. It is
necessary to clarify, that even though natural causes could be involved in the increase in PP
claims, weather changes should be assessed further to adjust the PP provisions to account for
those changes.
2.3. Data
Firstly, a description of the type of data and sources from where the data was obtained is
provided. Secondly, tables showing the correlation of the data are presented. Thirdly, a
description about the variables used in the model is presented. Furthermore, a distinction is made
between the weather variables, which are indispensable for the correct analysis of the model, and
the non-weather-related variables, which are introduced to identify the presence of moral hazard,
in the crops.
Description of the data
A panel data is gathered and joined together for the study, with a time horizon starting
from 2011 to 2020, based on the quality and availability of the data at the time of the research.
Furthermore, the research focuses on two regions in the U.S. These are the Plains region, which
is constituted by Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota and Oklahoma, as well as the
Southeast region, which includes Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina and
Tennessee.
Weather data was obtained from the PRISM Climate Group, which stands for
“parameter-elevation regressions on independent slopes model”, based at Oregon State
University and supported by the RMA. The spatial climate dataset was download and used at the
county level with daily observations.
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Additionally, the Cause of Loss Historical Data provided by the RMA, was firstly used to
obtained the information with respect to type of crop, insurance plan, type of loss, county and
year. However, after running the first analysis using the cause of loss ratio as the dependent
variable from our model and looking closely to the data, missing information and errors were
found.
Consequently, it was decided to use a different dataset to avoid reporting issues and get
better results. Furthermore, the data later used was the Crop Acreage Data Report provided by
Farm Service Agency (FSA). This institution requires all producers to submit an annual report
concerning cropland use on their farms if they participate in certain programs, making this
firsthand information trustworthy. From the report, the proportion of prevented planted acres is
calculated and added to the model as the dependent variable.
From the Crop Acreage Data Report, 3 of the most important crops are selected for the
analysis which are corn, soybean, and cotton. These crops are selected for their importance and
abundancy in most of the regions of the U.S.
Weather variables
The model integrates several weather variables, which are fundamental for the model
since in theory weather should be the only factor driving the number of PP claims. Accordingly,
variables that account for precipitation, extreme precipitation and frost are created to introduce
into the model.
The National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) conducts numerous surveys
annually, one of which is the number of days suitable for field work. Moreover, this data was
included in the model, the same which identifies the number of days where the weather and field
conditions are optimal, for farming operations. This variable is included as a different type of
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weather variable which can be insightful to understand how extreme the weather has to be, in
order to prevent farmers from working. The introduction of this variable into the model allows to
capture the effects of weather events such as snow, frost and rainfall all of which do not allow
the equipment’s to operate on the field and delay planting.
On the other hand, the cumulative precipitation, defined as the precipitation capture in the
soil at a particular time, was calculated using the winter precipitation or pre-planting season
(January to May) precipitation combined with the in-season precipitation. This simple
calculation was made by summing the monthly precipitation from each count 𝑖 at 𝑡 time.
𝑖

𝐶𝑚𝑝 = ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑡 (6)
𝑖=1

In addition, the excess of moisture defined as abnormal values of precipitation is
calculated. Consequently, every value above the sum of the average precipitation, plus the
standard deviation is considered to be an excess. Therefore, the excess of moisture 𝐸𝑥𝑀 is
calculated as the difference between the monthly precipitation 𝑃𝑟 𝑖𝑡 and the mean precipitation
̅̅̅ 𝑖𝑡 + the respective standard deviation of the precipitation Ϭ𝑃𝑟 .
𝑃𝑟
𝑖𝑡
̅̅̅ 𝑖𝑡 + Ϭ𝑃𝑟 ) (7)
𝐸𝑥𝑀 = 𝑃𝑟 𝑖𝑡 − (𝑃𝑟
𝑖𝑡
Non-Weather variables
Additionally, the model also integrates several non-weather-related variables, whose
purpose is to identify the effect in the number of PP claims, thereby, identifying the presence of
moral hazard in the provision. Accordingly, variables that account for expected harvest price and
input prices, are created and introduce into the model.
The expected harvest price is calculated using a process analogous to the projected price
from the Price Discovery produced by the RMA, which is calculated as the average of the daily
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settlement prices during the price discovery period. The price discovery period last for a month,
making the price discovery a monthly average settlement price.
Consequently, February future (before planting season starts) prices for the December
contract at the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) were used for corn, February prices for the
November contract at the CBOT were used for soybean, and February prices for the December
contract at the Intercontinental Exchange were used for cotton.
Since prices per state should also depend on a state basis an adjustment is made. The
adjustment helps localize the price of the commodity to ensure an accurate number regarding the
expected harvest price that farmer’s will assume in their planting decision.
Consequently, the adjustment factor 𝑃𝑎𝑓 is calculated by taking the index price received
𝑃𝑟𝑖 during the discovery month in state 𝑖 and subtracting the index price of the commodity in
state j where the exchange is located 𝑃𝑟𝑗 .
𝑃𝑎𝑓 = 𝑃𝑟𝑖 − 𝑃𝑟𝑗 (8)
For example, as corn futures contract is traded at the CBOT located in Illinois, the 𝑃𝑟𝑗
would be the index price in Illinois. Furthermore, to obtain the adjusted expected harvest price 𝑃𝑎
the monthly average settlement price 𝑃𝑝 for the discovery period are summed with the
adjustment factor 𝑃𝑎𝑓 .
𝑃𝑎 = 𝑃𝑝 + 𝑃𝑎𝑓 (9)
Finally, the adjusted expected harvest price is converted into a logarithmic form for
interpretation purposes. The logarithm of the adjusted expected harvest price is included in the
model to better assess the farmer’s response to high or low expected prices in their final decision
to file the PP claim or LP a second crop instead.
𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑎 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑝 + 𝑃𝑎𝑓 ) (10)
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The price ratio is calculated by dividing the current adjusted expected harvest price 𝑃𝑡 in
𝑡 time by the lagged adjusted expected harvest price 𝑃𝑡−1 , which is the harvest price received the
previous year. Then the variables are converted to a logarithmic form. The expected harvest price
is used and not the actual price received, since the farmers decision is based on expectations of
the price, which is uncertain during the pre-planting season. This variable is included as this ratio
is the rate of change in prices. It is expected that a change in the present price relative to last
year’s price, will affect farmer’s decisions.
𝑃𝑡
) (11)
𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = log (
𝑃𝑡−1
To obtain the cost of inputs, the monthly fertilizer cost index from the USDA was used.
However, information after 2018 is was not available, therefore, missing information was
completed using the following Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression:
Cost 𝑡 = β0 + β1 ∗ DAP𝑡 + β2 ∗ KCL 𝑡 + β3 ∗ UREA + β4 ∗ Diesel + β5 ∗ CPI (12)

Just like Wu, Goodwin, and Coble (2019), spot prices for diammonium phosphate (DAP)
at the US Gulf, potassium chloride (KCL) at Vancouver, urea at the Black Sea, diesel at New
York, and the consumer price index (CPI) from the Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis, were
used to calculate the missing information from 2018 to 2020.
Finally, the dependent variable is calculated by dividing the total of prevent planted acres
𝑃𝑃 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑡 in a giving county 𝑖 at a giving time 𝑡 by the total planted acres 𝑃𝐿 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑡 from the
FSA report, to create the proportion of prevent planting 𝑃𝑟𝑝𝑃𝑃, which is a non- negative
dependent variable.
𝑃𝑟𝑝𝑃𝑃 =

𝑃𝑃 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑡
(13)
𝑃𝐿 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑡

19

2.4. Fixed effects model
Using the variables describe previously, three fixed effect models are developed and
estimated. In order to control for the unobserved time invariant effects or for any individualspecific attribute that do not vary across time, all the models presented are run as fixed effect
models as expressed in the equation (14):
𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦̅𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽 (𝑥𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥̅ 𝑖 ) + (𝜀𝑖𝑡 − 𝜀̅𝑖 ) (14)
Where observation 𝑦 at 𝑖 county and 𝑡 time is subtracted by the county average. For
example, variables such as county, state, the type of crop and year do not change over time or
change at a constant rate over time for the case of “year”, which means these variables have
fixed effects or the effect they produce is constant.
The fixed effect model is used, since the heterogeneity of the sample used is not random
but fixed. In fact, based on the literature there are patterns that are state specific, meaning the
heterogeneity is individual specific and not random. In order to prove this theory, a Hausman test
is conducted as shown below.
Table 1. Hausman test results for the base model
Cotton
Corn
Soybeans
Chi2
72.21
231.69
66.13
Prob>chi2
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
Degrees of
7
7
7
freedom
Notes: Ho: Random effects are appropriate vs Ha: Fixed effects are appropriate.

The Hausman Test or model misspecification test is used on the panel data to choose
between the fixed effects model or the random effects model. The null hypothesis specifies that
the preferred model is random effects. However, the alternative hypothesis specifies that is
preferred to use is the fixed effects model. Given the results, it is concluded the effects are not
random but fixed, and the best model to use is the fixed effects model.
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For this reason, panel ids were created grouping the data by county, state, and crop. Later
the command xset from the statistical software package STATA was used to define the data as a
panel, using the panel ID and Year. Subsequently, the command xtreg was used to run all the
models, which specifies each model to have fixed effects.
Additionally, to identify that the used of the quadratic form from the variable “year” was
a better fit for the model than just “year”, a comparison between both models is made. The
Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) are used to
select the best model. Furthermore, it is determined that the model with the lowest AIC and BIC
is the one using the quadratic form of the variable year, meaning that it fits the model better.
Consequently, the base model or first model is described next in the equation (15):
𝑃𝑟𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 − 𝛽1 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑎 + 𝛽2 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 − 𝛽3 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 − 𝛽4 𝐷𝑠𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐶𝑚𝑝 + 𝛽6 𝐸𝑥𝑀
+ 𝛽7 𝑡 + 𝛽8 (𝑡 ∗ 𝑡)

(15)

Where, 𝑃𝑟𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the proportion of prevented plant acres at 𝑖 county at 𝑡 time, 𝐵0 is our
constant or intercept, 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑎 is the logarithm of the adjusted expected harvest price, 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 is
the logarithm of the price ratio, 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 is the cost of the inputs, 𝐷𝑠𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the days suitable for
farming operations, 𝐶𝑚𝑝 is the cumulative precipitation, 𝐸𝑥𝑀 is the excess of moisture, 𝑡 is the
year, and 𝑡 ∗ 𝑡 is the interaction term between years.
Furthermore, for the second model, a dummy or categorical variable that establishes a
lower bound price representing the equilibrium price is introduced. This variable is of great
importance to understand famer’s decision to prevent plant or late plant. It is estimated that
expected harvest prices below the bound would likely increase the willingness to prevent plant.
In other words, if the farmer is expecting a lower price that does not cover their planting cost,
s/he will opt to prevent plant if possible.
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This lower bound denominated “delta” is the long- run average cost (LRAC) and is
derived from the long run average price (LRAP), assuming that farmers are profit maximizers.
According to microeconomic theory in order to maximize profit, Marginal Revenue (MR) must
be equal to Marginal Cost (MC). Thus, the equality is transformed as follows:
𝑀𝑅 = 𝑀𝐶
𝑑 (𝑝) 𝑑 (𝑇𝐶)
𝑑 (𝑝) 𝑑 (𝑉𝐶 + 𝐹𝐶)
𝑑 (𝑝) 𝑑 (𝑉𝐶)
=
→
=
→
=
→ 𝐴𝑃 = 𝐴𝑉𝐶 → 𝐿𝑅𝐴𝑃
𝑑(𝑞)
𝑑(𝑞)
𝑑(𝑞)
𝑑(𝑞)
𝑑(𝑞)
𝑑(𝑞)
= 𝐿𝑅𝐴𝐶
Where Marginal Revenue (MR) equals the first derivative of price (P) with respect to
quantity (q) and Marginal Cost (MC) equals the first derivative of total cost (TC) with respect to
quantity (q). Normally in the short-run, total cost (TC) is equal to fixed cost (FC) plus variable
cost (VC), but in the long run fixed cost are considered to be zero. Subsequently, converting the
equation produces an equality between the Long Run Average Price (LRAP) and the Long Run
Average Cost (LRAC). Hence, the new variable delta 𝛿 is calculated using the next equation (16)
𝛿 = (𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑎𝑖 − ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑎 ) = {

1,
0,

𝑖𝑓 𝛿 < 0
(16)
𝑖𝑓 𝛿 > 0

Where 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑎 𝑖 is the log of the adjusted expected harvest price, and ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑎 is the Long
Run Average Cost (LRAC), calculated as the 10 year mean of the log of the adjusted expected
harvest price. Thus, a price difference lower than zero would be equal to 1 and a price difference
greater than zero would be equal to 0. Consequently, the second model is described next in the
equation 17:
𝑃𝑟𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝛿 + 𝛽2 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 − 𝛽3 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 − 𝛽4 𝐷𝑠𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐶𝑚𝑝 + 𝛽6 𝐸𝑥𝑀 + 𝛽7 𝑡
+ 𝛽8 (𝑡 ∗ 𝑡) (17)
Where, 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑎 the logarithm of the adjusted expected harvest price is subtracted, and
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substitute for the new variable 𝛿 define as “Low Price Indicator.”
For the third model the dummy variable delta defined as “Low Price” is transformed into
a continuous variable by multiplying delta by the log of the adjusted expected harvest price, as
seem in equation (18).
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 = (𝛿 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑎 ) (18)
Consequently, the third model is described next in the equation (19):
𝑃𝑟𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 − 𝛽1 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑎 + 𝛽2 𝛿𝑐 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 − 𝛽4 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 − 𝛽5 𝐷𝑠𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝐶𝑚𝑝
+ 𝛽7 𝐸𝑥𝑀 + 𝛽8 𝑡 + 𝛽9 (𝑡 ∗ 𝑡) (19)
Where, 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑎 the logarithm of the adjusted expected harvest price is once again
included, and delta 𝛿 is substitute for its continuous version 𝛿𝑐 define as “Continuous Low
Price”.
2.5. Logit transformation
Even though the used of the fixed effects model has been tested as a better fit against the
random model. The very nature of the data and the dependent variable used in the model, the
same which is a proportion, raise the question if the model used is the best. In order to handle the
data with a bounded nature, and fix any irrational prediction for extreme values of the regressors,
a logit transformation is proposed as suggested in the Stata Journal (Baum, 2008). This
transformation can be expressed in equation (20) below:
y =

1
(20)
1 + exp(−Xβ)

Consequently, the transformation creates the response variable y ∗ as expressed in equation
(21) below:

𝑦
) (21)
y ∗ = log (
1−𝑦
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However, the interpretation of the results would change, and it would be defined as the
change in log of odds. In other words, the change in the likelihood of an event occurring. For
example, the odds of claiming the prevent plant payment.
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Chapter 3. Results
3.1. Summary statistics
A summary of statistics for all the variables included in the model is presented below in
Table 2. The number of observations range from 30,326 to 33,764 depending on the variable.
Furthermore, it was found that the average proportion of prevent planting claims was .0241037,
which will range from 0 to 1, since is a proportion, with a maximum of .994117. The adjusted
expected harvest price defined as “High price” had an average price of 1.714837/bushel with a
maximum of $2.616666/bushel. The average low adjusted expected harvest price, which in other
words is the average prices below the breakeven cost line, was $.9783272/bushel, with a
maximum of $2.347558/bushel. The average projected price ratio was .0408262 and a maximum
of .6135295. The average number of days suitable for farming operations was 65.21 days with a
maximum of 174.9. The average input cost was $78.8248/acre, with a maximum of $101.4/acre.
The average pre-season precipitation was 329.1304 millimeters, with a maximum of 1080.82.
Finally, the average excess of moisture in the soil was 77.79782 millimeters, with a maximum of
1080.82 millimeters.
Table 2. Summary statistics from all the variables
Variable
Proportion of Prevent
Planting

Obs.
33,764

Mean
0.0263753

Std. Dev.
0.0911609

Min
0

Max
0.994117

High Price

30,346

1.69894

0.7585859

-.597837

2.616666

Continuous Low
Price

30,346

0.9783272

0.962438

-.597837

2.347558

(table cont’d.)
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Variable
Projected Price Ratio

Obs.
30,326

Mean
.0408262

Std. Dev.
0.1185566

Min
-.3024478

Max
0.6135295

Days suitable for
farming operations

32,729

65.21653

22.12648

8.5

174.9

Cost Index

33,764

78.8248

18.63446

46.87901

101.4

Pre-season
Precipitation

33,716

329.1304

133.5573

0

1080.82

Excess Moisture

33,764

77.79782

185.3216

0

1080.82

Year

33,764

2015.5

2.872326

2011

2020

3.2. Data correlation
Table 3. shows the inverse relationship between the expected prices and the number of
PP claims for cotton, which is the basis for the research and the selection of the variables.
Table 3. Correlation between PP claims and expected
harvest price for cotton
Average PP
Average expected
claims per state
harvest price per
state
Average PP
claims per state

1.000

-

Average expected
-0.0356
1.000
harvest price per
state
Notes: The correlation between price and number of PP
claims is inverse.

Table 4. shows the inverse relationship between the expected prices and the number of
PP claims for corn, which is the basis for the research and the selection of the variables.
Table 4. Correlation between PP claims and expected
harvest price for corn
Average PP
Average expected
claims per state
harvest price per
state
Average PP
claims per state

1.000
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-

Average expected
-0.7133
1.000
harvest price per
state
Notes: The correlation between price and number of PP
claims is inverse.

Table 5. shows the inverse relationship between the expected prices and the number of
PP claims for soybeans, which is the basis for the research and the selection of the variables.
Table 5. Correlation between PP claims and expected
harvest price for soybeans
Average PP
Average expected
claims per state
harvest price per
state
Average PP
claims per state

1.000

-

Average expected
-0.5150
1.000
harvest price per
state
Notes: The correlation between price and number of PP
claims is inverse.

3.3. Fixed effects base model
Table 6 displays the results for the first or base model, with fixed effects, and robust
standard errors. The proportion of prevent plant acres 𝑃𝑟𝑝𝑃𝑃 is the dependent variable against
which all independent variables are regressed. Furthermore, in their majority the results follow
the expected coefficient signs for the statistically significant variables. Note that robust standard
errors are used to correct for heteroscedasticity. Because robust standard errors can provide a
more accurate measure for the true standard error of a regression coefficient.
The first variable “High Price” is negative for cotton, which confirms the inverse
relationship between the adjusted expected harvest price and the amount of PP claims. In
contrast this variable is positive and statistically significant for corn and soybeans. Based on the
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results it would seems as if the farmer’s expected harvest price influences their decision to PP
claim only when planting cotton. Moreover, the results show that in the case of cotton, each 1%
increase in the adjusted expected harvest price, would reduce the proportion of prevent planting
acres by 0.151 acres, holding everything else constant. On the other hand, in the case of corn and
soybeans the increase in price would actually increase the likelihood of PP claim by 0.0607 and
0.0282 acres, respectively.
Table 6. Fixed effects base model results
Variable
High Price

Description
𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑎
Adjusted expected
harvest price

Cotton
-0.151***
(0.0430)

Corn
0.0607***
(0.0116)

Soybeans
0.0282**
(0.0133)

Projected Price
Ratio

𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜
Adj. expected
harvest price/
lagged expected
harvest price

0.0681***
(0.0204)

0.0127**
(0.00598)

0.0378**
(0.0147)

Cost Index

Input costs

0.000784
(0.000590)

-0.000230
(0.000171)

0.000596**
(0.000266)

Days suitable for
farming
operations

Number of days
optimal for
working

-0.000426***
(0.0000940)

-0.00151***
(0.000119)

-0.00119***
(0.000118)

Preseason
Precipitation

Cumulative
precipitation from
January to May

0.0000413*
(0.0000226)

0.0000597***
(0.0000115)

0.0000465***
(0.0000102)

Excess Moisture

Difference
between
precipitation and
the average
precipitation plus
the standard
variation

0.0000689***
(0.0000163)

0.0000226***
(0.00000637)

0.0000387***
(0.00000693)

Notes: Numbers in parenthesis are the standard errors; significance levels are 1% (***), 5% (**),
10% (*). Proportion of prevent plant acres is used as the dependent variable
(table cont’d.)
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Variable
Year

Description

Cotton
-14.61***
(4.075)

Corn
-2.374***
(0.617)

Soybeans
-0.164
(0.467)

Year Squared

0.00362***
(0.00101)

0.000590***
(0.000153)

0.0000421
(0.000116)

Constant

14717.0***
(4105.2)

2389.4***
(622.1)

160.3
(470.5)

Observations

2787

3045

14785

No. of counties

300

331

1500

R-squared (overall)

0.0798

0.0648

0.0574

Adj. R-squared

.112689

.0924532

.0844767

F-Statistics

10.77

67.43

64.14

Prob > F
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
Notes: Numbers in parenthesis are the standard errors; significance levels are 1% (***), 5% (**),
10% (*). Proportion of prevent plant acres is used as the dependent variable.

The second variable “Projected Price Ratio” is positive and statistically significant for
cotton, corn and soybean. This variable captures the change in the expected price with respect to
last year, explaining that if last year’s harvest price was greater than the current year, the farmer
will be inclined to PP. Hence, the positive sign which determines that the greater the change in
harvest price with respect to last year’s, the greater the proportion of prevent planting claims
relative to the planted acres. In the case of cotton this would mean that each 1% increase in the
projected price ratio, would increase the proportion of prevent planting acres by 0.0681 acres.
Similarly, in the case of corn this would mean that each 1% increase in the projected price ratio,
would increase the proportion of prevent planting acres by 0.0127 acres. Likewise, in the case of
soybean this would mean that each 1% increase in the projected price ratio, would increase the
proportion of prevent planting acres by 0.0378 acres.
The third variable “Cost Index”, is positive and statistically significant for soybeans. In
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contrast, it is statistically insignificant for cotton and corn. Furthermore, this would mean that the
increase in input cost for soybeans would increase the proportion of prevent planting, just as
expected. In the case of soybeans, the increase of $1/acre of input cost, would increase the
proportion of prevent planting acres by 0.000596 acres.
The fourth variable “Days Suitable for Farming Operations”, is negative and statistically
significant for all three crops. This variable intuitively explains the inverse relationship between
the amount of days optimal for working on the field and the success of the crop or PP claim. In
the case of cotton the results show that the increase of 1 day suitable for planting, would reduce
the proportion of prevent planting acres by 0.000426 acres. Alternatively, in the case of corn, the
increase of 1 day suitable for planting, would reduce the proportion of prevent planting acres by
0.00151 acres. Similarly, in the case of soybean, the increase of 1 day suitable for planting,
would reduce the proportion of prevent planting acres by 0.00119 acres.
The fifth variable “Pre-season Precipitation”, is positive and statistically significant for
all three crops, as expected. Since weather conditions or in this case precipitation is the greatest
cause of loss for PP claims. In the case of cotton, the results show that the increase of 1
millimeter of rain, would increase the proportion of prevent planting acres by 0.0000413 acres.
Likewise, in the case of corn, the results show that the increase of 1 millimeter of rain, would
increase the proportion of prevent planting acres by 0.0000597 acres. Similarly, for soybean, the
results show that the increase of 1 millimeter of rain, would increase the proportion of prevent
planting acres by 0.0000465 acres.
The sixth variable “Excess Moisture”, is also positive and statistically significant for all
three crops, just as expected since the excess of moisture in the soil is the main cause of loss for
PP claims in the Plains region and Southeast region. In the case of cotton, the results show that
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the increase of 1 millimeter of rain above the monthly average, would increase the proportion of
prevent planting acres by 0.0000689 acres. Likewise, in the case of corn, the results show that
the increase of 1 millimeter of rain above the monthly average, would increase the proportion of
prevent planting acres by 0.0000226 acres. Similarly, in the case of soybean, the results show
that the increase of 1 millimeter of rain above the monthly average, would increase the
proportion of prevent planting acres by 0.0000387 acres.
The seventh variable “Year” resulted to be negative and statistically significant for cotton
and corn. This would mean that each year that passes by reduces the amount of PP claims.
However, this result seems to be just a small part of a wider picture. Consequently, the eight
variable “Year Squared” is also introduced in the model. This variable which in contrast is
positive and also statistically significant for cotton and corn, allows to see the bigger picture.
Concluding that as matter of fact year over year the number of PP claims are getting reduced, but
also over time the number of claims keep growing. In other words, the number of PP claims is
increasing at decreasing rate.
This means in the case of cotton, that with every 1 year that passes, the proportion of
prevent planting acres decreases by 14.61 acres relative to the previous year. In contrast, every 1
year that passes, also increase the total proportion of prevent planting acres by 0.00362 acres.
Likewise, in the case of corn this would mean, that with every 1 year that passes, the
proportion of prevent planting acres decreases by 2.374 acres relative to the previous year. In
contrast, every 1 year that passes, also increase the total proportion of prevent planting acres by
0.00590 acres.
It is inferred from these results that from the 3 crops, cotton is the most prominent in
showing the presence of moral hazard, followed by soybean. In contrast, corn appears to be free
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of moral hazard for this data.
3.4. Fixed effects with dummy variable
Table 7 is calculated with the new added variable delta defined as “Lower Price
Indicator” and without the variable “High Price”. Consequently, Table 7 displays the results for
the second model, with fixed effects and robust standard errors. Just as before the proportion of
prevent plant acres 𝑃𝑟𝑝𝑃𝑃 is the dependent variable against which all independent variables are
regressed.
Table 7. Fixed effects with dummy variable results
Variable
Low Price

Description
𝛿 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑎
Delta* Log
Adjusted expected
harvest price

Cotton
0.0228***
(0.00792)

Corn
-0.00360
(0.00320)

Soybeans
0.00875***
(0.00323)

Projected Price
Ratio

𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜
Adj. expected
harvest price/
lagged expected
harvest price

0.00350
(0.0197)

0.00789
(0.00630)

0.0245*
(0.0136)

Cost Index

Input costs

0.000207
(0.000479)

-0.0000625
(0.000163)

0.000974***
(0.000215)

Days suitable for
farming
operations

Number of days
optimal for
working

-0.000563***
(0.000107)

-0.00147***
(0.000116)

-0.00121***
(0.000118)

Preseason
Precipitation

Cumulative
precipitation from
January to May

0.0000517**
(0.0000226)

0.0000634***
(0.0000113)

0.0000522***
(0.0000105)

Notes: Numbers in parenthesis are the standard errors; significance levels are 1% (***), 5% (**),
10% (*). Proportion of prevent plant acres is used as the dependent variable.
(table cont’d.)
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Variable
Excess Moisture

Description
Difference
between
precipitation and
the average
precipitation plus
the standard
variation

Cotton
0.0000610***
(0.0000161)

Corn
0.0000271***
(0.00000624)

Soybeans
0.0000378***
(0.00000687)

Year

-9.854***
(2.720)

-4.253***
(0.460)

-2.385***
(0.573)

Year Squared

0.00245***
(0.000675)

0.00106***
(0.000114)

0.000593***
(0.000142)

Constant

9927.9***
(2740.9)

4283.7***
(463.6)

2398.2***
(577.7)

Observations

2787

3045

11936

No. of counties

300

331

1199

R-squared (overall)

0.0613

0.0711

0.0570

Adj. R-squared

.102044

.090550

.0844809

F-Statistics

11.02

66.67

60.44

Prob > F
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
Notes: Numbers in parenthesis are the standard errors; significance levels are 1% (***), 5% (**),
10% (*). Proportion of prevent plant acres is used as the dependent variable.

The new added variable “Lower Price Indicator” is positive and statistically significant
for both cotton and soybeans. Nevertheless, corn becomes statistically insignificant with respect
to the first fixed effect model. It is worth noting that the signs got switched from negative when
using “High Price”, to positive using “Lower Price Indicator” as a lower bound for cotton.
The result show that in the case of cotton, each 1% increase in the adjusted expected
harvest price below the equilibrium price, would increase the proportion of prevent planting
acres by 0.0228 acres. In other words, the increase in “Lower Price” is to the downside, or
basically a decrease in the adjusted expected harvest price, which increase the number of PP
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claims. Likewise, for soybeans this would mean that each 1% increase in the adjusted expected
harvest price below the equilibrium price, would increase the proportion of prevent planting
acres by 0.00875 acres.
In contrast, with the previous model, the second variable “Projected Price Ratio”
becomes statistically insignificant for cotton, becomes insignificant for corn, cotton and reduces
the significance for soybeans. Furthermore, in the case of soybeans the results show that each 1%
increase in the projected price ratio, would increase the proportion of prevent planting acres by
0.0245 acres.
The third variable “Cost Index”, remains insignificant for cotton and corn, but becomes
more significant for soybeans from 5% level to a 1% level. The results show that in the case of
soybeans, the increase of $1/acre of input cost, would increase the proportion of prevent planting
acres by 0.000974 acres.
The fourth variable “Days Suitable for Farming Operations” remains negative and
statistically significant for all of the three crops. In the case of cotton the results show, the
increase of 1 day suitable for planting, would reduce the proportion of prevent planting acres by
0.000563 acres. Alternatively, in the case of corn, the increase of 1 day suitable for planting,
would reduce the proportion of prevent planting acres by 0.00147 acres. Similarly, in the case of
soybean, the increase of 1 day suitable for planting, would reduce the proportion of prevent
planting acres by 0.00121 acres.
The fifth variable “Pre-season Precipitation”, remains with the same coefficient signs,
improving the statistical significance for corn, from 10% to 5% level. In the case of cotton, this
would mean that the increase of 1 millimeter of rain, would increase the proportion of prevent
planting acres by 0.0000517 acres, which is more than before. Likewise, in the case of corn, this
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would mean that the increase of 1 millimeter of rain, would increase the proportion of prevent
planting acres by 0.0000634 acres, which is a bit more than before. Similarly, for soybean, this
would mean that the increase of 1 millimeter of rain, would increase the proportion of prevent
planting acres by 0.0000522 acres, which is more than before.
Furthermore, the sixth variable “Excess Moisture”, remains with the same positive
coefficient signs and significance level. In the case of cotton, the results show that the increase of
1 millimeter of rain above the monthly average, would increase the proportion of prevent
planting acres by 0.0000610 acres. Likewise, in the case of corn, this would mean that the
increase of 1 millimeter of rain above the monthly average, would increase the proportion of
prevent planting acres by 0.0000271 acres. Similarly, in the case of soybean, this would mean
that the increase of 1 millimeter of rain above the monthly average, would increase the
proportion of prevent planting acres by 0.0000378 acres.
Furthermore, the seventh variable “Year” and the eight variable “Year Squared” maintain
their coefficient signs and significance level as for cotton and corn, but they also become
significant for soybean. Consequently, the results show that in the case of cotton, with every 1
year that passes, the proportion of prevent planting acres decreases by 9.854 acres relative to the
previous year. In contrast, every 1 year that passes, also increase the total proportion of prevent
planting acres by 0.00245 acres.
Likewise, in the case of corn the results show that with every 1 year that passes, the
proportion of prevent planting acres decreases by 4.253 acres relative to the previous year. In
contrast, every 1 year that passes, also increase the total proportion of prevent planting acres by
0.00106 acres. Similarly, in the case of soybeans the results show that with every 1 year that
passes, the proportion of prevent planting acres decreases by 2.385 acres relative to the previous
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year. In contrast, every 1 year that passes, also increase the total proportion of prevent planting
acres by 0.000593 acres.
It is proven that overall, the addition of the dummy variable delta defined as “Lower
Price” helps with the accuracy of the model.
3.5. Fixed effects with continuous variable
Table 8 is calculated with the new continuous variable defined as “Continuous Lower
Price” and the variable “High Price” is again introduced into the model. Therefore, Table 8
displays the results for the third model, with fixed effects and robust standard errors. Like before
the proportion of prevent plant acres 𝑃𝑟𝑝𝑃𝑃 is the dependent variable against which all
independent variables are regressed.
Table 8. Fixed effects with continuous variable results
Variable
High Price

Description
𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑎
Adjusted expected
harvest price

Cotton
-0.136***
(0.0450)

Corn
0.0788***
(0.0135)

Soybeans
0.0742***
(0.0181)

Continuous Low
Price

𝛿 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑎
Delta* Log
Adjusted expected
harvest price

-0.0179
(0.0200)

0.00618***
(0.00236)

0.0102***
(0.00196)

Projected Price
Ratio

0.0658***
(0.0207)

0.00662
(0.00630)

-0.00544
(0.0198)

Cost Index

𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜
Adj. expected
harvest price/
lagged expected
harvest price
Input costs

0.000964
(0.000637)

-0.000259
(0.000174)

0.000578**
(0.000267)

Days suitable for
farming
operations

Number of days
optimal for
working

-0.000434***
(0.0000924)

-0.00150***
(0.000119)

-0.00121***
(0.000120)

Notes: Numbers in parenthesis are the standard errors; significance levels are 1% (***), 5% (**),
10% (*). Proportion of prevent plant acres is used as the dependent variable.
(table cont’d.)
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Variable
Preseason
Precipitation

Description
Cumulative
precipitation from
January to May

Cotton
0.0000435*
(0.0000228)

Corn
0.0000582***
(0.0000115)

Soybeans
0.0000436***
(0.0000103)

Excess Moisture

Difference of
precipitation and
the average
precipitation plus
the standard
variation

0.0000682***
(0.0000163)

0.0000229***
(0.00000638)

0.0000392***
(0.00000696)

Year

-14.70***
(4.133)

-2.499***
(0.628)

-1.443**
(0.563)

Year Squared

0.00365***
(0.00103)

0.000621***
(0.000156)

0.000359**
(0.000140)

14807.2***
2516.1***
1450.1**
(4163.6)
(632.8)
(567.2)
Observations
2787
3045
14785
No. of counties
300
1400
1199
R-squared (overall)
0.0793
0.0611
0.0570
Adj. R-squared
0.09743
0.09184
0.0837
F-Statistics
10.02
59.93
58.90
Prob > F
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
Notes: Numbers in parenthesis are the standard errors; significance levels are 1% (***), 5% (**),
10% (*). Proportion of prevent plant acres is used as the dependent variable.
Constant

The first variable “High price” is significant for all three crops, with a negative
coefficient for cotton and a positive coefficient for corn and soybeans. Therefore, the results
show that in the case of cotton, each 1% increase in the adjusted expected harvest price, would
reduce the proportion of prevent planting acres by 0.136 acres.
The second modified variable “Continuous Low Price” maintains the same positive
coefficient signs for corn and soybeans, becoming insignificant for cotton. Furthermore, the
results show that in the case of corn, each 1% increase in the adjusted expected harvest price
below the equilibrium price, would increase the proportion of prevent planting acres by 0.00618
acres. Similarly, for soybeans the results show that each 1% increase in the adjusted expected
harvest price below the equilibrium price, would increase the proportion of prevent planting
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acres by 0.00102 acres.
The third variable “Projected Price Ratio” becomes only significant for cotton. In the case
of cotton, the results show that each 1% increase in the projected price ratio, would increase the
proportion of prevent planting acres by 0.0658 acres.
The fourth variable “Cost Index”, remains to be only significant for soybeans. The results
show that in the case of soybeans, the increase of $1/acre of input cost, would increase the
proportion of prevent planting acres by 0.000578 acres.
Likewise, the fifth variable “Days Suitable for Farming Operations” remains with the
same negative coefficient signs and significance, for all three crops. The results show that in the
case of cotton, the increase of 1 day suitable for planting, would reduce the proportion of prevent
planting acres by 0.000434 acres. Likewise, in the case of corn, the increase of 1 day suitable for
planting, would reduce the proportion of prevent planting acres by 0.00150 acres. Similarly, in
the case of soybean, the increase of 1 day suitable for planting, would reduce the proportion of
prevent planting acres by 0.00121 acres.
The sixth variable “Pre-season Precipitation” also maintains the same layout as the
second fixed effect model. Meaning the three coefficients are positive and significant. The
results show that in the case of cotton, the increase of 1 millimeter of rain, would increase the
proportion of prevent planting acres by 0.0000435 acres, which is more than before. Similarly, in
the case of corn, the increase of 1 millimeter of rain, would increase the proportion of prevent
planting acres by 0.0000582 acres, which is more than before. Likewise, in the case of soybeans,
the increase of 1 millimeter of rain, would increase the proportion of prevent planting acres by
0.0000436 acres, which is more than before.
The seventh variable “Excess Moisture” maintains the same layout as the second fixed
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effect model, where all three crops are significant with positive coefficients. The results in the
case of corn show that the increase of 1 millimeter of rain above the monthly average, would
increase the proportion of prevent planting acres by 0.0000682 acres. Similarly, in the case of
corn, the results show that the increase of 1 millimeter of rain above the monthly average, would
increase the proportion of prevent planting acres by 0.0000229 acres. Likewise, in the case of
soybean, the results show that the increase of 1 millimeter of rain above the monthly average,
would increase the proportion of prevent planting acres by 0.0000392 acres.
Furthermore, the eight variable “Year”, the ninth variable “Year Squared” and the tenth
variable “Constant” are significant for all three crops with the same coefficient signs as before.
Consequently, the results show that in the case of cotton, with every 1 year that passes, the
proportion of prevent planting acres decreases by 14.70 acres relative to the previous year. In
contrast, every 1 year that passes, also increase the total proportion of prevent planting acres by
0.00365 acres. Similarly, the results show that in the case of soybeans, with every 1 year that
passes, the proportion of prevent planting acres decreases by 2.499 acres relative to the previous
year. In contrast, every 1 year that passes, also increase the total proportion of prevent planting
acres by 0.000621 acres. Likewise, the results show that in the case of soybeans, with every 1
year that passes, the proportion of prevent planting acres decreases by 1.443 acres relative to the
previous year. In contrast, every 1 year that passes, also increase the total proportion of prevent
planting acres by 0.000359 acres.
3.6. Logit fixed effects model
Table 9 displays the results for the model using the logit transformation, with fixed
effects, and robust standard errors. The change in log of odds 𝑃𝑟𝑝𝑃𝑃 is the dependent variable
against which all independent variables are regressed. Furthermore, in their majority the results
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follow the expected coefficient signs for the statistically significant variables. Note that robust
standard errors are used to correct for heteroscedasticity. Because robust standard errors can
provide a more accurate measure for the true standard error of a regression coefficient.
Table 9. Fixed effect vs Logit Fixed effects
High Price

Fixed
-0.136***
(0.0450)

Logit
-7.330***
(1.396)

Fixed
0.0788***
(0.0135)

Logit
2.617***
(0.538)

Soybeans
Fixed
Logit
0.0742***
1.454**
(0.0181)
(0.566)

Continuous Low
Price

-0.0179
(0.0200)

-0.00967
(1.087)

0.00618***
(0.00236)

0.105
(0.0919)

0.0102***
(0.00196)

0.402***
(0.0951)

Projected Price
Ratio

0.0658***
(0.0207)

4.100***
(0.960)

0.00662
(0.00630)

0.155
(0.266)

-0.00544
(0.0198)

-0.182
(0.691)

Cost Index

0.000964
(0.000637)

0.0452*
(0.0232)

-0.000259
(0.000174)

-0.0217***
(0.00814)

0.000578**
(0.000267)

0.0464***
(0.0103)

Days suitable for
farming operations

-0.000434***
(0.0000924)

-0.00531
(0.00614)

-0.00150***
(0.000119)

-0.0856***
(0.00409)

-0.00121***
(0.000120)

-0.0728***
(0.00532)

Preseason
Precipitation

0.0000435*
(0.0000228)

0.00313***
(0.00101)

0.0000582***
(0.0000115)

0.00435***
(0.000527)

0.0000436***
(0.0000103)

0.00282***
(0.000500)

Excess Moisture

0.0000682***

0.000480

0.0000229***

0.0000392***

0.000454**

Year

(0.0000163)
-14.70***
(4.133)

(0.000466)
-420.5***
(65.65)

(0.00000638)
-2.499***
(0.628)

0.0000276
(0.000189)
-42.23
(25.84)

(0.00000696)
-1.443**
(0.563)

(0.000187)
-177.9***
(36.77)

0.00365***
(0.00103)

0.104***
(0.0163)

0.000621***
(0.000156)

0.0105
(0.00641)

0.000359**
(0.000140)

0.0442***
(0.00912)

Variable

Year Squared

Cotton

Corn

14807.2***
423556.2***
2516.1***
42461.7
1450.1**
178987.7***
(4163.6)
(66110.2)
(632.8)
(26024.2)
(567.2)
(37055.0)
Observations
2787
713
3045
5388
14785
5177
No. of counties
300
232
1400
1118
1199
1076
R-squared (overall)
0.0793
0.1332
0.0611
0.0759
0.0570
0.0534
Adj. R-squared
0.11507
0.24357
0.0928616
0.3528020
0.085408
0.2836600
F-Statistics
10.02
16.12
59.93
171.82
58.90
125.26
Prob > F
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
Notes: Numbers in parenthesis are the standard errors; significance levels are 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*). The
table displays the comparison between the third fixed effect model and the fourth model with the logit
transformation.
Constant
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The first variable “High price” maintains the same coefficient signs and significance, as
in the third fixed effect model without the logit transformation. Therefore, the results show that
in the case of cotton, each 1% increase in the adjusted expected harvest price, would reduce the
odds of prevent planting acres by 7.3%. However, according to the model, in the case of corn
and soybeans, each 1% increase in the adjusted expected harvest price, would increase the odds
of prevent planting acres by 2.6% and 1.4%, respectively.
The second modified variable “Continuous Low Price” remains statistically insignificant
for cotton, becomes statistically insignificant for corn and remains significant for soybean. Also,
all crops maintain the same coefficient signs. Furthermore, the results show that in the case of
soybeans each 1% increase in the adjusted expected harvest price below the equilibrium price,
would increase the odds of prevent planting by 0.4%.
The third variable “Projected Price Ratio” maintains the same layout as before in the third
fixed effect model, where the projected price for cotton is positive and the only significant
variable. In the case of cotton, the results show that each 1% increase in the projected price ratio,
would increase the odds of prevent planting by 4.1%.
The fourth variable “Cost Index”, becomes statistically significant for cotton and corn at
the 10% and 1% level of significance. Additionally, the coefficient for soybeans improves its
significance from 5% level to 1%. All three crops maintain the same coefficient sign, which is
positive for cotton and soybeans, and negative for corn.
The results show that in the case of cotton, the increase of $1/acre of input cost, would
increase the odds of prevent planting by 0.04%. Similarity, in the case of soybean, the increase of
$1/acre of input cost, would increase the odds of prevent planting by 0.04%. Conversely, in the
case of corn, the increase of $1/acre of input cost, would reduce the odds of prevent planting by
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0.02%.
Likewise, the fifth variable “Days Suitable for Farming Operations” keeps the same
negative coefficient signs and significance, for corn and soybeans. However, cotton becomes
statistically insignificant. The results show that in the case of corn, the increase of 1 day suitable
for farming operations, would reduce the odds of prevent planting by 0.0856% acres.
Alternatively, in the case of soybean, the increase of 1 day suitable for farming operations, would
reduce the odds of prevent planting by 0.07%.
The sixth variable “Pre-season Precipitation” also maintains the same layout as the third
fixed effect model. Meaning the three coefficients are positive and significant. The results show
that in the case of cotton, the increase of 1 millimeter of rain, would increase the odds of prevent
planting by 0.003 %. Similarly, in the case of corn, the increase of 1 millimeter of rain, would
increase the odds of prevent planting by 0.004%. Likewise, in the case of soybeans, the increase
of 1 millimeter of rain, would increase the odds of prevent planting by 0.002%.
The seventh variable “Excess Moisture” becomes insignificant for cotton and corn.
Additionally, the level of significance for soybeans get reduced from 1% to 5% level. The results
in the case of soybeans show that the increase of 1 millimeter of rain above the monthly average,
would increase the odds of prevent planting by 0.000454.
Furthermore, the eight variable “Year”, the ninth variable “Year Squared” and the tenth
variable “Constant” remains the same for cotton. On the other hand, corn losses all the statistical
significance and soybeans improves its statistical significance from a 5% to 10%.
For the data used in this study the logit fixed effect model performs better, given that the
dependent variable is a proportion. Further research may investigate the goodness of fit of the
logit fixed effects model in this type of data.
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Chapter 4. Summary and Conclusions
This research examines the presence of ex-post moral hazard in the prevent planting
provision from the crop insurance program in cotton, corn and soybeans for the Plains and
Southeast Regions of the U.S. Furthermore, three fixed effect and one logit fixed effect model,
were developed. The first model was based on previous research from Wu, Goodwin, and Coble
(2019), and Kim and Kim (2018). Moreover, the second and third model integrates the breakeven point variable, that helps to highlight the change in behavior under or above that line.
Finally, the fourth model introduces the logit transformation, in order to correct for irrational
predictions as specified in the Stata Journal (Baum, 2008). From the start of the research, it was
always expected that weather variables would have a strong effect in the amount of PP claims or
in this case the proportion of prevent planting acres, which was the dependent variable used for
the first 3 models. Since the PP provision is defined as “failure to plant an insured crop by the
final planting date, or within any applicable late planting (LP) period,” because of severe weather
events, like drought or excess moisture (2013 Crop insurance handbook, USDA-RMA, 2013). It
is expected that if there is no presence of moral hazard, most if not all of the explanatory power
from the model would fall upon weather variables, however, this was not the case. After
analyzing the results, it was found that other non-weather-related variables have a great effect in
the proportion of prevent planting, as well as the odds of prevent plant for two out of the three
crops used in the analysis.
In fact, it was found that the proportion of prevent planting acres and the odds of prevent
plant, were endogenous to changes in the input price, expected harvest price and break-even
point, in the case of cotton and soybeans. Therefore, confirming the presence of ex-post moral
hazard in these two crops in the Plains and Southeast Regions. Other studies like Wu, Goodwin,
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and Coble (2019), have found similar results with strong evidence suggesting that cotton is
indeed affected by moral hazard.
In contrast, this was not the case for corn which was mostly affected by the weather
variables and which results were inconclusive with the expected theory. Therefore, there is no
conclusive evidence that suggest corn is being affected by moral hazard in the Plains and
Southeast region of the U.S. On the other hand, our results seem to contradict or may not be
consistent with the ones from Wu, Goodwin, and Coble (2019) which found moral hazard for
corn and soybeans in the Prairie Pothole Region.
Furthermore, this could actually be a good indicator that the proper corrections to the
program are being made in the case of corn. Since the main objective of the insurance program is
to help farmers without discouraging them to abandon production.
4.1. Recommendations
Based on the results, it is recommended for further research to analyze the quantity of
acres of corn has shifted to cotton or soybean production. One of the theories that could explain
the inconsistency with the results for corn, is that when input cost are higher farmers might
change their production toward other crops. In effect, transferring the moral hazard effect from
this crop to another.
Additionally, it is necessary to clarify, that even though natural causes could be involved
in the increase in PP claims, weather changes should be assess further, to adjust the PP
provisions to account for those changes.
In addition, the logit fixed effects model seems to perform better, given the dependent
variable is a proportion. However, further research recommended in order to identify the best
model to approach this type of study and data.
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It is beyond the scope of the study to propose a policy change to reduce ex-post moral
hazard. However, it is recommended more research regarding the incentive’s farmer could
receive if they do not go through with PP. According to the Office of the Inspector General
(OIG) report in 2013 the RMA needs to be more cost effective, encouraging farmers to plant a
second crop when is possible by making the eligibility criteria clearer. Perhaps, one way to do
so, could be by adapting the indemnity payments, increasing the benefits for the late planting
(LP) and review each claim more carefully.
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Appendix. Correlation between PP claims and expected price
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